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1 Introduction
At least a hundred and fty countries around the world have public pension programs.
As documented in Gruber and Wise (1999) and Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2004), these
programs share several common striking features. First, over 70% of countries pay pension
benets in a way as to discourage work by their elderly citizens. This is starkly evident
from the fact that retirement, nearly everywhere, is a necessary condition for receiving full
public pension benets. In addition, governments use a variety of stick and carrotmea-
sures to dissuade the elderly from seeking work: high implicit taxes and earnings penalties
on income earned beyond a certain age act as sticks while generous benets act as carrots.
Second, an important prerequisite for receiving public pension benets in almost every
case is a documented long history of labor market participation. Finally, public pension
programs generally have pay-as-you-go features implying substantial intergenerational re-
distribution. In this paper, we provide a rationale for pension programs with these features.
We also o¤er a novel channel by which cross-cohort redistribution may take place.
Explanations for the existence of social security are classied by Mulligan and Sala-
i-Martin (2004) as either political theories or e¢ ciency theories. The former view social
security as redistribution, the outcome of a political struggle.The elderly are the winners
of a political contest in which the reward is a pension (see Boldrin and Rusticini, 2001).
E¢ ciency theories, on the other hand, identify market ine¢ ciencies (e.g., imperfect nancial
markets) and explain how a pension program might be created to alleviate them. We follow
the latter route and isolate a novel market ine¢ ciency arising out of search frictions in the
labor market. We go on to demonstrate that public pensions can increase aggregate welfare
by partly removing such distortions.
Consider a labor market characterized by search and matching frictions and in which
individuals at di¤erent positions along the lifecycle compete with each other for the same
jobs. In such a setting, assuming a xed stock of available job vacancies, increased labor
market participation by the old would restrict the employment prospects of the young.
Public pension programs, by encouraging retirement of the elderly, may therefore improve
the ability of young workers to nd jobs. Moreover, such programs can also provide incen-
tives for rms to create more vacancies. As discussed in Oi (1962), rms incur xed costs
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while establishing employment relationships with workers. If the age composition of the
labor force is heavily skewed towards the elderly, then rms may not nd it protable to
create vacancies.1 Why? While post-match bargaining with the worker ensures a correct
division of the post-match surplus created by the job, it does not compensate the rm for
its pre-match sunk cost. The rm can better spread this expense if it gets matched with
a young worker (one with a long expected tenure) than an old worker (one with a short
tenure). In short, rms would earn higher prots by hiring young workers rather than the
old. In such an environment, it is possible that the allocation of workers to jobs would
be improved by removing some old jobless workers from the labor market. We argue that
pension programs act in this way so as to foster job creation and raise welfare.23
These channels establish that social security programs can help alleviate distortions
in the labor market along the extensive margin. We also illustrate how these programs
may be responsible for reducing ine¢ ciencies along the intensive margin. To see this,
notice that young jobseekers with more time remaining in the job market are in a superior
bargaining position compared to their older jobless counterparts. As such, rms would
have to part with a large fraction of the post-match surplus in order to attract these
people to work. On its own, this e¤ect would hamper rm entry and potentially reduce
aggregate welfare. We identify an entirely novel route by which pension programs may
undo this bargaining advantage of the young and foster cross-cohort redistribution. By
1This assumes that age discrimination laws limit rmsabilities to sort across workers.
2 In related work, Shimer (2001) also studies the implications of population aging for the labor market.
He shows that young workers work for less due to their lack of labor market experience while we show
this e¤ect can be entirely induced by public pension programs. In contrast to our work, all workers in
his model are innitely-lived and in each period, a new generation of workers is born. Our methodology
is most closely related to Pissarides (1992) who utilizes a two-period overlapping generations model with
labor market frictions to study the implications of the loss of productivity that may accompany long-term
unemployment. In contrast to our framework, all jobs in his model only last for one period, and there are
no costs to labor market participation. While his analysis provides a number of interesting implications for
aggregate labor market outcomes, it does not address the important interactions between wages at each
stage of the lifecycle, age-targeted labor market policies (such as public pension programs), and retirement
decisions.
3The paper that is closest in spirit to our paper is Sala-i-Martin (1996). In his setup, the old are assumed
to be less productive than the young. Moreover, since there are spillovers in the production technology
resulting from the average level of labor productivity, the old lower the productivity of the young in the
economy. Social security helps induce the old to pull out of the labor force, thereby raising the average level
of labor productivity in the economy and promoting economic growth. In contrast, we abstract away from
possible di¤erences between young and old workers, except for their naturally di¤erent positions along the
lifecycle and their labor market experiences. In our setting, gross output from a match with either a young
or a newly employed old worker is the same.
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requiring a long employment history as a prerequisite for participation, pension programs
raise the future value of current employment thereby inducing the young to work for less
(in exchange for future transfer payments). They also raise the option value to not working
for the old and eligible. In this manner, pension programs e¤ectively transfer income away
from the young and towards the elderly and eligible. In our setup, therefore, cross-cohort
redistribution can take place indirectly via rms in the form of higher (lower) wages for
the old (young) in addition to the more standard pay-as-you-go transfers. The potential
substitutability of one form of redistribution for another is an important, yet neglected
dimension in the debate about social security reform currently in progress in all OECD
countries.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we outline the model
environment, specify the timeline of events, describe the various search-related costs, and
compute payo¤s to rms and workers. In Section 3, we compute wages and discuss the
properties of the wage function for young workers, especially its connection to pension
benets. Section 4 denes an equilibrium in our model and describes a result on existence
and uniqueness. As a benchmark for the e¤ects of social security and induced retirement,
Section 5 outlines an equilibrium in which there are no public pensions and all workers
participate in the labor market. Section 6 establishes the positiveaspect of our analysis
by demonstrating that economies can obtain higher welfare under public pension programs
that cause retirement to occur. Section 7 contains some concluding remarks. Proofs of
important results are contained in the appendices.
2 The Model
2.1 Environment
Consider an economy consisting of an innite discrete sequence of two-period lived over-
lapping generations populated by two types of agents, workers and rms. There is no
population growth. In each period, there are workers of two di¤erent ages  the young
(with measure 12) and the old.
At birth, all workers are jobless. Old workers may be in one of three possible states:
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the long-term unemployed (those who did not nd jobs when young), displaced (they
were employed while young, but have involuntarily lost their job; see discussion below), or
employed.4 All workers are risk-neutral: There are no saving instruments. Firms produce
a homogeneous consumption good each period using labor as the sole factor of production.
Production is the result of pairwise matching between one worker and a rm. Firms are
innitely-lived with a total population of measure F in each period: They each have access
to the same technology and seek to maximize the present discounted stream of revenues
net of all costs. Workers and rms share the same discount factor  2 (0; 1) :
2.2 Time line
The time line is as follows. At the start of each period, the labor market opens. At that
time, jobless workers, be they old or young (the new born agents), choose whether to search
for vacancies or not. If they decide to search, they incur a search cost, s; which is expressed
in terms of disutility of search. As described in Pissarides (2000), s represents the imputed
value of leisure in terms of output (utility). On the other side of the market, rms make the
decision whether to pay some upfront costs (described below) and enter the labor market
to look for employees. Each rm may employ at most one worker. Let U (Fv) denote the
total mass of unemployed workers (unlled vacancies) at the start of a period.
A stochastic matching technology connects all job seekers with open vacancies. The
technology does not discriminate on the basis of age, and therefore, any job seeker (old
or young) faces the same (endogenous) probability  of getting matched with a vacancy:5
Once the labor market opens, rms and workers have at most one opportunity to meet
and match. At the end of any period, the employment relationship between a worker and
a rm ends involuntarily with a given probability b.6 Put di¤erently, a given match lasts
4Following Pissarides (1992), we refer to those who did not nd jobs when young as the long-term
unemployed. Since displaced workers are individuals who found job matches when young, but incurred a
job separation, we can also refer to them as separatedworkers. Hence, we use the terms displacedand
separatedinterchangeably.
5Our matching structure bears many similarities to Pissarides (1992). As in his framework, workers and
rms may make at most one job contact each period, and the probabilities of matching are the same for
each type of worker irrespective of age (i.e., we also assume a non-discriminating matching technology).
6All job separations in the model are exogenous and outside of the workers inuence. In this sense, b is
a measure of the frequency of involuntary job separations, and therefore, parameterizes the degree of job
security. See Gottschalk and Mo¢ tt (1999) for related discussion.
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for a minimum (maximum) length of one (two) period(s).
At the beginning of the period, an old worker nds himself in one of three possible
employment categories: employed [attached to a match from the previous period with
probability  (1  b)], unemployed [with probability (1   )], or displaced (working when
young, but lost the job with probability b).7 On-the-job search is disallowed by our
assumption regarding timing of labor market openings. For future reference, note that
the long-term unemployed, unlike displaced workers, have no prior history of labor force
attachment. This will create a distinction between them if governmental transfer payments
are contingent on their employment history.8 At the end of the period, young employed
workers learn their employment status for the following date (i.e., whether their current
match survives to the next period or gets dissolved); at this time, old workers die.
2.3 The Labor Market
As discussed in the introduction, public pension programs in many countries aim to induce
retirement by the elderly so as to alleviate unemployment among the young. In this
paper, we focus solely on the role played by public pension programs in encouraging the
jobless elderly to withdraw from the labor market.9 In many European countries, for
example, workers can collect early retirement benets after an involuntary separation (see
7Long term job attachment is an important feature of labor market behavior. For example, 34% of U.S.
male workers aged 25 and over had worked for their current employer for 10 years or more in February
2000; for workers aged 55-64, 28% had worked for their current employer 20 years or more. In addition,
Hall (1982) nds that after a job has lasted 5 years, the probability that it will eventually last 20 years or
more in all rises to close to 0.5 among workers in their early thirties. These data imply that tenure with
a rm can be quite long. The low frequency nature of our overlapping generations setup is well-suited to
capture this aspect of the labor market. It bears emphasis that job turnover in our framework is entirely
involuntary.
8This is one of the benets of our deterministic, discrete-time model. Since each worker receives only
one job contact each period, it is very easy to trace an old workers employment status to his employment
history. The linkages between eligibility for transfer payments (such as social security) and a workers prior
labor market history are clearly important, yet often ignored in models of the labor market.
9Displacement is an important route towards retirement in many OECD countries. For example, Chan
and Stevens (2002) show that displacement increases the probability of retirement in the U.S. labor market.
Specically, they emphasize that this may be due to the costs of job search and loss of rm-specic human
capital. OLeary and Wandner (2000) conclude that while less than 10% of displaced workers under the
age of 55 permanently exit the labor force, more than 25% between the ages of 55 and 64 and almost half
of workers over the age of 65 opt for retirement instead of searching for alternative sources of employment
upon displacement. Diamond and Hausman (1984) also discuss how job loss among older workers leads to
retirement.
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Gruber and Wise (1999) and especially, Boldrin, Jimenez-Martin, and Peracchi, 1999,
among others). In France, the contrat de solidarité recognizes the double need to
encourage 55-59 year-old workers to stop work and to bring young workers into the labor
market, as rising youth unemployment was a growing concern to society as a whole.A
precondition to receiving unemployment benets for people over the age of 55 is that they
stop seeking employment.10
We formally motivate these ideas in a setting where an individuals position along
the lifecycle a¤ects his opportunities in the labor market. Furthermore, the participation
decisions of all workers have general equilibrium implications through their impact on the
number of job vacancies created by rms. En route to studying the possible desirability of
policies that a¤ect labor market participation by the elderly, we analyze a setting where
a particular subset of workers chooses to retire. In particular, we consider the general
equilibrium consequences of public policies that encourage displaced (separated) workers
to withdraw from the labor market.
In terms of deriving the endogenous labor market participation decisions of all workers
(in particular, old workers), we adopt the following algorithm. We rst condition on a set
of strategies where all separated workers have chosen to withdraw from the labor market
by accepting retirement benets rather than incurring the costs of job search. We then
study how public pensions must be designed in order to support the conjectured steady-
state equilibrium. We proceed by verifying that a separated worker is better o¤ choosing
to collect pension benets rather than searching for a job. This is the algorithm we adopt
in order to endogenize labor force participation for every type of worker at each stage of
the lifecycle.
2.4 Costs
Firms incur sunk costs of posting vacancies, denoted by a. Once they have incurred this cost
and searched for workers, all rms are equally likely to nd a worker. The probability that
10 In Britain, the Job Release Scheme which ran between 1977 and 1988, specically encouraged older
workers to stand down to make way for younger ones. Once out of employment, changes to the unemploy-
ment benet regime in 1983 removed the requirement for men over 60 to look for work, encouraging them
to see themselves as retired. For more details, see the OECD (1995) study on The Labor Market and
Older Workers.
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a vacancy nds a worker is  (to be determined in equilibrium below). The probabilities
of meeting a given type of worker, however, will depend on the proportion of each type
in the labor market. In our conjectured equilibrium, only the young and the long-term
unemployed actively search for jobs. While the total measure of unemployed workers is U;
the total measures of the young and long-term unemployed are uy and uo. The probability
of nding a young unemployed worker is ~uy; where ~uy  uy
U
: Similarly, the probability
that a vacancy locates a long-term unemployed worker is ~uo. The next lemma reports
these population proportions for future use.
Lemma 1
U =
1 + (1  )
2
~uy  uy
U
=
1
1 + (1  )
~uo  uo
U
=
(1  )
1 + (1  )
An important point to note here is that the population proportions are all endogenous
variables since they depend on : An implication of this is that policies aimed at altering
the age-composition of the labor force also change these proportions, and thereby a¤ect
the probability with which rms encounter workers of other age groups. This general
equilibrium e¤ect is at the heart of our analysis.
Following the insights of Oi (1962) and Hutchens (1986), we posit that there are costs
which must be incurred at the beginning of an employment relationship. We refer to these
as hiringcosts, and denote them as h: Let the exogenously-determined market value of
the rms output be normalized to 1. Matches with new hires require the rm and the
worker to incur the costs of hiring and trainingso that the net output from new matches
is (1   h) while net output from a match with an old, retained worker is 1.11 Under this
interpretation, one may view h as a cost that is incurred each time a rm makes a new
11Note that our framework di¤ers from the standard search-theoretic model with ex-ante heterogeneity.
Although one may view the old, retained workers in our setup as high types and the displaced and the
long-term unemployed workers as low types, the probability of becoming a high type is endogenous.
This is an important distinguishing feature of our model. In particular, as we demonstrate below, the
chance of becoming a hightype will be crucially a¤ected by policy.
8
hire. Alternatively, h may proxy a productivity di¤erential between new and old matches.
In the latter sense, one may also interpret h as a parameter which reects the importance
of rm-specic human capital. Firms therefore derive higher net revenues from employing
workers with longer expected tenure.
The wage rate(s) for the di¤erent types of workers are determined (see below) in accor-
dance with the protocols of Nash bargaining. As shown there, the presence of age-targeted
labor market policies and the aforementioned accumulation of rm-specic human capital
will cause the wages of workers (with di¤erent employment histories) to vary.
2.5 Specication of Labor Market Policies
We incorporate various aspects of real-world age-specic labor market policies, such as
public pension programs and long-term old-age unemployment insurance programs, into
our model. These take a particularly simple and stylized form. Old workers, currently
or previously employed, are eligible for transfer payments from the government. As is
common in many countries, these payments are tied to a workers prior attachment to
the labor market. In that vein, we assume that an individual who worked when young is
potentially eligible for a xed lump sum benet of B0:
We also allow for aspects of earnings reductions, as observed in many programs, in our
framework. We capture the notion of an earnings test by asserting that workers who
work when old receive only a fraction  of benets due to them:12
013 For example, suppose
that an old worker who retained her job from a previous match receives a wage of weo.
Then gross of pension benets, he obtains total income in the amount weo + B0: Since we
conjecture that displaced workers choose to retire, in equilibrium, they earn total income
B0: The long-term unemployed are not eligible for benets since they have no documented
12The earnings testthat was applied in the United States until 2000 could be described as follows. In
1999, a worker age 62 to 65 could earn up to $9,600 without the loss of any benets, then benets were
reduced $1 for each $2 of earnings above this amount; for workers age 65 to 69, the earnings test oor
was $15,500 and benets were reduced at a rate of $1 for each $3 in earnings. Although our framework
is not suited to capture the specic features of various versions of the earnings test, we can consider its
implications, more broadly dened, for retirement behavior and wages of older workers.
13 In our specication, the higher the value of , the lower is the implicit tax rate on elderly work. Gruber
and Wise (1999) nd that while this tax is relatively low in the United States (around 20%), it is much
higher in a number of European countries (as much as 80%).
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history of labor force attachment.14
In order to study the desirability (or lack thereof) of public pension programs that
induce workers of certain ages and employment histories to withdraw from the labor market,
we will henceforth construct the model under the conjecture that public policies successfully
induce only the separated workers to leave the labor market, and collect B0: In our analysis
below, we will provide a set of su¢ cient conditions under which this conjectured equilibrium
exists.15
2.6 WorkersPayo¤s
Let Jy denote the expected lifetime utility accruing to a worker who decides to search
when young, Jeo the expected utility of an old worker who begins the period employed
and continues his employment, Juo the expected utility of an old worker who did not get
matched when young and is back in the labor market seeking employment, and Jso the
expected utility of an old separated (displaced) worker. Then, it is easy to see that
Jy =  s+  [wy + (1  b)Jeo + bJso ] + (1  )maxf0; Juo g (1)
Juo =  s+ wuo ; Jeo = weo + Bo (2)
Jso = Bo (3)
It is instructive to explore the economic interpretation of eq.(1), as the explanations
of the other value functions follow straightforwardly. A young worker seeking employment
incurs an upfront cost s: Upon entering the labor market, he gets matched with a rm with
probability : In that case, he gets a wage wy and also the expected discounted continuation
payo¤s from possible employment and separation the following period. If he is unsuccessful
in nding a job, he will nd himself in the state of being a long-term unemployed worker.
14For now, we ignore issues relating to funding of these programs. The consequent analytical tractability
allows us to explicitly endogenize the labor market participation patterns on the basis of the design of public
pension programs and formally prove existence of the conjectured steady-state equilibrium. In Section 6 ,
we study the e¤ects of pension programs under a balanced budget constraint.
15Pissarides (1976), in an innite-horizon model with sequential search, also studies the choice of labor
market participation. He derives the optimal number of times individuals will choose to search for jobs
before becoming discouraged and withdrawing from the labor market. However, he does not consider
the role of the lifecycle in his analysis. His model also does not address how labor market participation is
inuenced by pension or labor market policies.
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From (1), it is also clear that the value of a job to a young worker is much more than
just the current wage. Because jobs are potentially durable (long-lasting), a match today
bestows certain continuation privileges to the worker, a fact that will play a prominent role
during the wage-bargaining phase.16
2.7 Payo¤s to rms
Firms begin each period in one of two possible states. They may currently have a vacancy,
or they may be matched with an old worker from a previous employment relationship.
Letting v (f ) be the expected lifetime prots of a rm that has an unlled (lled)
vacancy at the beginning of the period, the following equations describe the associated
expected present discounted prots of a rm in each state:
v =  a+ ~uy f(1  h  wy) + (1  b)f + bvg (4)
+~uo f[1  h  wuo ] + vg+ (1  )v
f = (1  weo) + v (5)
As indicated above, if the rm is currently matched with an old worker, it will have a
vacancy next period it if incurs the cost a. Note that the rm does not face any hiring
costs if the employment relationship from the previous period is retained. Also note that
rms take the proportions, ~uy and ~uo; as given when deciding whether to enter the labor
market.
The following closed form expression for the steady state payo¤ to entry will be of
considerable use below:
v =
 a+ ~uy (1  h  wy) + ~uy(1  b)(1  weo) + ~uo (1  h  wuo )
1  ~uy(1  b)2   ~uyb   ~uo   (1  )
 : (6)
16Davidson, Martin, and Matusz (1994) demonstrate how the durability of jobs results in a social surplus
when workers have nite lives in an innite-horizon economy. However, unlike their paper, we embed this
idea into an overlapping generations framework. In addition, we explicitly introduce important features of
pension programs which reinforce the role of employment beyond current compensation thereby leading to
intergenerational income redistribution.
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2.8 Matching
Unemployed workers and unlled vacancies are brought together each period through a
stochastic matching technology. The matching technology describes the total number of
matches, m = M(U;Fv), that are formed at the beginning of each period, depending
on the total masses of unemployed workers and unlled vacancies. Since  represents the
probability that an unemployed worker will nd any vacancy in the time period and  is
the probability that any unlled vacancy will nd an unemployed worker, it follows that
the total number of workers who nd employment (  U) must equal the total number of
rms that lled their vacancies (  Fv):  U =  Fv: It is important to note that  and 
are determined in equilibrium, and that both workers and rms take them as given when
making their decisions. Noting that m =   Fv; we have
U = Fv = m = M(U;Fv) (7)
the matching condition. It is standard to assume that the matching technology takes the
Cobb-Douglas form: m = (U)1 (Fv) where  2 [0; 1]: Noting that Fv = (U)1 (Fv);
it follows that  =
h


U
Fv
i1 
: An increase in either the number of unemployed workers
or unlled vacancies increases the number of matches each period, but at a decreasing rate.
Ceteris paribus, more matches occur when  is higher.
For analytical tractability, in all of the algebra we report below, we will assume  = 1:
Then,  =   1 obtains. In fact, it is easiest to conduct our analysis (and obtain closed
form solutions to various endogenous variables) for the case where  =  = 1: This implies
thatM(U;Fv) = Fv: Vacancies always nd a worker, but workers may nd a vacancy only
with a probability  2 (0; 1) that will be determined below.17 In such an economy, the
congestion problems facing unemployed workers are severe. Below, we will remark on how
our results depend on the extent of congestion problems encountered by both workers and
vacancies by studying numerical examples with  < 1:
17We only study equilibria in which there are more unemployed workers than vacancies. Hence, we have
both U > Fv and  < 1 in our analysis.
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3 Bargaining and Wage Determination
The friction inbuilt into the job-rm matching process creates the possibility that a rm
may remain unproductive or a worker may remain unemployed in any period. Firms and
workers must therefore weigh the implications of nding themselves in these states and their
outside options when bargaining over their share of current and future surplus produced.
Two important things deserve mention here. First, the outside options available to workers
are crucially a¤ected by policy, and second, these outside options are dependent on past
employment history and on ones position in the lifecycle. Below, we will demonstrate
the powerful implications of this last observation. To foreshadow, we will establish the
presence of a skewnessin bargaining position towards the young, and the role played by
pension programs in undoingsome of the resultant inequities.
3.0.1 Wage functions
We now turn to the determination of the wage o¤er functions for both young and old
workers. Matches between workers and unlled vacancies leads to a surplus that is to
be divided between the worker and the rm. Nash bargaining dictates that the total
match surplus be shared by the rm and the worker; principally for analytical tractability,
we assume symmetric Nash bargaining: For an old worker with an unbroken employment
relationship from the previous period, the gain from the match is [weo + B0]   B0: The
corresponding gain to the rm is (1  weo + v) v = 1 weo:18 Then, Nash bargaining
implies
weo =
1 + (1  )Bo
2
(8)
Analogously, it follows that the wages to a long-term unemployed worker (one who has no
history of labor force attachment) is given by
wuo =
(1  h)
2
: (9)
18We assume that even when a match survives on to the second period, wages are determined by a fresh
process of bargaining at the start of the second period. Also note that the outside option, due to the timing
assumptions in the model, is discounted.
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Finally, we turn to the wage determination for a young worker. The gains from trade for
the rm are given by
1  h  wy +  [bv + (1  b)f +v]  v (10)
while the young workers surplus from nding employment is given by
wy +  [bJ
s
o + (1  b)Jeo   Juo ] (11)
The analytical expression for the wages accruing to a young worker is described in the
following lemma.
Lemma 2 a) Under the assumption of linear matching ( = 1), the expression for the
wage function for the young is given by
2wy = (1  h)

1 +

2

   (B0 + s) (12)
b) If (1  h) >  (B0 + s), then wy > 0:
Note that part b) of Lemma 2 is a su¢ cient condition for young workers to earn positive
wages, since it holds for any possible value of :
Ceteris paribus, higher search costs s, reduce the wages to the young by reducing the
option value to waiting and searching in the future. It also follows that, ceteris paribus, a
higher pension benet B0; reduce the wages to the young, an issue to which we now turn.
3.0.2 Discussion of the wage function for the young
Suppose for the moment that all public pension programs are absent, i.e., B0 = 0: In this
case, using (8)-(9), we have:
wuo =
(1  h)
2
; weo =
1
2
Also, using (11), the young workers surplus from nding employment is given by:
wy + (1  b)weo   Juo :
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and, using (10), the rms surplus (assuming free entry) from hiring the young worker is
given by:
1  h  wy + (1  b) (1  weo) :
Equating, we get
wy =
(1  h)
2
+
1
2
(1  b) (1  weo) 
1
2
(1  b)weo +

2
Juo (13)
=
(1  h)
2
+

2
Juo > w
u
o (14)
A young worker can expect that his job will last beyond the current period. The wage
function for young workers reects this via the fact that the value of employment this
period is more than just the current wage. It is now apparent that inequities in bargaining
strength over the lifecycle arise, purely because of agentspositions on the lifecycle. Young
workers, who have the option of searching for jobs when old, will have a higher threat point
in negotiating over wages than old workers (who have no such outside option).19
We are now in a position to isolate a key social function played by pension programs
towards reducing the aforementioned inequity. To see this, recall that young workers (by
virtue of the fact that they likely have a period ahead of them) have a higher bargaining
position than the old. Also a fundamental eligibility criterion for receiving pensions when
old is a history of labor force attachment. Employment when young therefore raises the
workers expected net income in the future. The threat point of a young worker (arising
from their position in the lifecycle) is therefore partially reduced because the rm is aware
that having a job today implies current (and future) benets to the employee; the rm
naturally extracts part of that surplus. It is in this sense that public pensions help redis-
tribute bargaining strength from young to old workers, raising the wages for the old and
19 It is important to note here that past private earnings do not a¤ect a workers current bargaining
strength because of our earlier assumption ruling out any form of asset accumulation or saving.
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eligible and reducing the wages of the young.20 ;21
The above discussion was based entirely on ceteris paribusarguments, since  was
held constant throughout the discussion. We now turn to the determination of  along
with all other endogenous variables.
4 Equilibrium
4.1 Denition and Existence
We focus exclusively on time-invariant equilibria. This will allow us to investigate the
properties of long-run equilibria in the labor market. A steady-state equilibrium with no
labor market participation by the displaced (separated) workers is formally dened below.
DEFINITION A steady-state equilibrium with no labor market participation by
displaced workers [an induced retirement equilibrium] consists of wage functions wy;
weo; and w
u
o [dened in (8), (9), and (12)], policy parameters, B0 and ; and a quadru-
ple (; ; U; Fv) satisfying the following conditions: (i) Symmetric Nash bargaining; (ii)
(Unrestricted Entry for rms): v = 0 ; (iii) (Steady-State): U = Fv = M(U;Fv),
with linear matching,  = 1; and (iv) the labor market participation/non-participation con-
straints hold: Juo > 0; Jy > J
u
o ; J
e
o > Bo and the displaced worker constraint holds (see
below).
4.2 Labor Market Participation Conditions
As stated in the denition of the equilibrium, we impose a pattern of labor market par-
ticipation across workers of di¤erent age groups and employment histories and then state
20Black (1987) also nds that social security a¤ects age-earnings proles. In his model, workers would
rather receive private pension payments than wages as a result of social security taxes. As workers become
older, they switch from pension payments to wages since the returns from pension savings would be lower.
Therefore, social security tends to generate upward-sloping age earnings proles. In his work, the retirement
date is exogenous (he does not explore the early retirement incentives in the social security system). In
addition, there is no unemployment in his model.
21 In contrast to symmetric Nash bargaining, we could posit that agentsbargaining weights vary across
the lifecycle. If old individuals receive higher weights than young workers, young agentsoutside options
would have less impact on wage determination. Consequently, there would be less need for intergenerational
redistribution.
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conditions under which this pattern emerges as an equilibrium. In particular, we study
a steady-state equilibrium in which old workers who have experienced job loss during the
course of their careers choose to accept their pension benets and withdraw, rather than
incur the costs of job search. Old individuals who have retained their jobs continue working
since they have higher productivity than when they were initially employed. In contrast,
the long-term unemployed with no access to pension benets choose to look for jobs. We
also provide conditions to ensure that the young actively search for jobs.
We begin with a discussion of the participation conditions for old workers who have
retained jobs from their youth. In order for them to continue working, we must have
Jeo = w
e
o + Bo > Bo: (15)
which using (8) reduces to 1 > (1  )Bo; a su¢ cient condition for which is 1 > Bo:
The next step is to nd conditions under which displaced workers choose to accept
pension benets and retire rather than incur the costs of job search. If a separated worker
chooses to accept pension benets, his expected utility is: Jso = Bo. However, the decision
to withdraw from the labor force must yield higher expected utility. Therefore, the following
condition must hold:
Bo >  s+ ws + Bo + (1  )Bo (16)
Under the assumption that an individual displaced worker chooses to search for a job (an
individualdeviation), with probability  the displaced worker would be able to obtain
employment and would earn total income (ws + Bo). In this event, the wage he would
earn is given by:
ws =
(1  h) + (1  )Bo
2
(17)
Alternatively, if unable to nd employment, the worker would still be able to collect pension
benets. Using (17) in (16), it follows that policy- induced withdrawal by displaced workers
occurs if (1  h) > (1  )Bo and
 <
2s
[(1  h)  (1  )Bo] (18)
holds. This provides an upper-bound for :
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In contrast, for the long-term unemployed to search for jobs, we require that:
Juo =  s+ wuo > 0
Using (9), this condition may be rewritten to provide a minimal value for  for which the
long-term unemployed remain active in the labor market:
 >
2s
(1  h) (19)
Obviously, if the search costs are too high, the long-term unemployed would be better o¤
choosing not to search for jobs. A quick comparison of (18) and (19) reveals the following
insight regarding the earnings test.
Lemma 3 For an induced retirement equilibrium to exist, it is necessary but not su¢ cient
that there be an earnings penalty, i.e.,  < 1 must obtain.
If  = 1, an induced retirement equilibrium does not exist. Finally, in order for young
workers to search for jobs, the expected utility of participation when young must exceed
the value of waiting and looking for a job when old. This implies that:
Jy =  s+  [wy + (1  b)Jeo + bJso ] + (1  )Juo > Juo (20)
The following lemma provides conditions on  such that young workers choose to actively
search in the labor market.
Lemma 4 a) Suppose that the displaced worker constraint is satised and (1   h) >
(B0 + s). In addition, let b1  [(1   h)    (B0 + s)]: If wy() > s, then (20) is sat-
ised and young workers will choose to search for jobs, which obtains when
 > L   b1 +
2
p
b21 + 4(1  h)s
(1  h) > 0 (21)
b) L > 2s(1 h)
To summarize, a valid induced retirement equilibrium value of  under linear matching
must satisfy (18), (19), and (21); additionally, the level of benets B0 must satisfy (1 h) >
max [(1  )Bo;  (B0 + s)] : Henceforth we will maintain the assumption:
18
Assumption 1 a)
(1  h) > max [(1  )Bo;  (B0 + s)] (22)
b)
3 (1  h) > 4a (23)
4.3 Equilibrium Entry Condition
Firms enter the labor market in search of employees until all prot opportunities from
new jobs are driven to zero. This free-entry conditiondictates that the expected present
value of future prots attributable to lling the marginal vacancy must equal the cost of
vacancy-posting and hiring the next worker. Utilizing the wage functions described above,
along with v = 0 [see (6)], we have
a

 1
~uy
= (1  h  wy) + (1  b) (1  weo) +

~uo
~uy

(1  h  wuo ) (24)
Then, setting  = 1; candidate equilibrium values of  are derived from (24) using Lemma
1, (8), (9), and (12). One of the major benets of using a simple matching technology like
ours is that closed-form solutions to (24) can be analytically derived.22
The following proposition describes the conditions required for existence of an induced
retirement equilibrium.
Proposition 1 a) The unique solution to (24) in terms of ; is given by
   (B0; ) = 2

s+ (1  b) + B0 [1  (1  b) (1  )] + 2 [(1  h)  2a]
[(1  h) (2 + )  4a]

: (25)
b) Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, for  in (25) to be part of an induced retirement
equilibrium with  = 1; (18), (19), and (21) must hold or, more compactly, the condition
 2

L;min

2s
[(1  h)  (1  )Bo] ; 1

22As stated above, each worker experiences the same probability of nding a job vacancy. This assumes
strict enforcement of age discrimination laws. Alternatively, one could consider that rms sort across
di¤erent types of workers. In this manner, there would e¤ectively be two di¤erent labor markets: a market
for young workers and a separate market for old. Under equilibrium entry, rms earn the same expected
net prots. However, more vacancies would be posted in the young labor market.
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holds.23
4.4 Partial equilibrium e¤ects of increasing the generosity of benets
As discussed in Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2004), many OECD countries have municent
pension programs that induce the jobless elderly to retire and make way for the young. In
this section, we establish the e¤ects of varying the generosity of pension programs within
an induced retirement equilibrium. Assuming that an equilibrium exists, we are able to
analytically derive the e¤ects of pension benets on employment and the age-composition
of the labor force. We begin by reporting the results of some comparative static exercises
conducted with respect to B0: It bears emphasis here that all the upcoming results in this
subsection assume away any issues relating to funding of B0 and are hence to be understood
as being partial equilibriumin nature. As Section 6 will demonstrate, these insights are
robust to settings in which pension benets are funded endogenously by payroll taxes. The
principal benet of the partial equilibrium perspective is that it allows us to derive a
number of interesting clean results analytically.
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1, an increase in B0 raises the probability of nding
employment. In particular, we have:
@
@B0
=
2 [1  (1  b) (1  )]
[(1  h) (2 + )  4a] > 0: (26)
An increase in B0 reduces the wages of the young and at the same time raises the
wages of old workers with jobs. Since the young constitute the bulk of the jobseekers,
this raises the benet from rm entry, and more rm entry makes it easier for any given
worker to nd a vacancy thereby raising the employment rate. Therefore, we refer to this
transmission channel of pension programs as the vacancy creation e¤ect.On the face of
it, Proposition 2 is a formal statement of the type of argument governments use to defend
generous pension programs ostensibly intended to free up jobs for the young.
23For a generic ; it is easily checked that (25) is given by
 =
2
(1  h) (2 + )  4a


2

1  h  2a


+ (1  (1  b)(1  ))B0 + s+ (1  b)

which we use later when doing numerical computations with a non-linear matching technology.
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An immediate consequence of Proposition 2 is the following corollary.
Corollary 1 An increase in B0 changes the age-composition of the labor force via
@~uy
@B0
=   1
(~uy)
2

  @
@B0

> 0
@~uo
@B0
=   1h
1 + 1(1 )
i2  1(1  )2 ( ) @@B0 < 0
As established by Proposition 2, higher pension benets increase the probability that
any worker is able to obtain employment. In particular, since there will be less workers
who are unable to nd jobs when young, the pool of the long-term unemployed will be
smaller. Consequently, more generous pension benets raise the probability with which
rms are likely to encounter a young worker. As we describe below, from examining (8),
(9), and (12), this vacancy creation e¤ect has implications for age-earnings proles in
the economy:
Proposition 3 An increase in B0 raises the wages to the old and employed and has no
e¤ect on the wages of the never-before-employed. The e¤ect on young wages is ambiguous.
The e¤ect on wy can be seen from the expression for wy; reproduced here for conve-
nience:
2wy = (1  h)

1 +

2

   (B0 + s)
On the one hand, a higher B0 raises  which serves to raise wy [the vacancy creation
e¤ecti.e., workers can nd jobs more easily and hence their pricemust go up], but on the
other hand, a higher B0 serves to reduces wy [this is the bargaining strength redistribution
e¤ectthat was discussed in Section 3]. The net impact is ambiguous and depends on the
relative strength of the two aforementioned e¤ects. In particular, the vacancy creation
e¤ect somewhat compromises the income redistributive goal of social security.
Under the linear matching technology, the e¤ect of an additional vacancy on the prob-
ability of nding of a job can be substantial. This may even cause the wages of the
young to rise with benets. Numerical computations conrm that with a small degree
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of non-linearity ( < 1) in the matching function, the vacancy creation e¤ect (an indi-
rect inuence) is muted and dominated by the direct bargaining strength redistribution
e¤ect. Intuitively, the latter e¤ect will dominate the vacancy creation e¤ect as long as
rms also encounter congestion problems in the labor market, i.e., there is some degree of
diminishing returns to the addition of another vacancy.24
Example 1 Let s = 0:15; a = 0:2; h = 0:4;  = 0:2;  = 0:95;  = 0:4; B0 = 0:2;
b = 0:2; and  = 0:7: For this parametric specication,  = 0:61867; and for this value of
; all other conditions outlined in the denition of the induced retirement equilibrium hold.
Using this conguration, it is apparent from Figure 1 that raising the level of benets lowers
the wages to the young and raises the wages to the old and eligible, thereby accomplishing
cross-cohort income redistribution.
This, in some sense, is a major punchline of the paper. In the model, pension programs
raise the incomes of the old with jobs and tend to reduce the incomes of the young, thereby
engineering an intergenerational income distribution towards the elderly. The novelty of
our paper lies in the fact that we can demonstrate the presence of such intergenerational
income distribution in the complete absence of any equity or political economy concerns.
5 The absence of policy
In this section, as a benchmark for considering the e¤ects of induced retirement, we briey
outline the environment in the absence of any policy intervention. Since much of the basic
structure of the economy remains the same, we choose to minimize detailed discussion of
the analysis.
We start by revisiting the value functions describing the expected lifetime utility of
workers.
Jy =  s+  [wy + (1  b)Jeo + bJuo ] + (1  )Juo ; Jeo = weo; Juo =  s+ wuo
Recall that in the absence of policy, the old separated are indistinguishable from the old
24See Bhattacharya, Mulligan, and Reed (2003) for further discussion.
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never-before-employed, and can be lumped into the single category of jobless elderly. The
value functions for the rms are the same as before.
It is clear that the wage functions for old jobless workers and retained individuals are
the same as in the previous section since they do not depend on the probability of nding
a job. In contrast, the wage paid to the young is however di¤erent. Even though the gains
from trade to the rm from hiring a young worker remain the same as before, a young
workers surplus from nding employment is now given by
wy + bJ
u
o + (1  b)Jeo   Juo = wy +  (1  b) s   (1  b)wuo + (1  b)weo
In particular, the surplus reects that young workers will choose to search for jobs when
they become old since induced retirement does not occur. Under symmetric bargaining,
and free entry, it can be shown that
wnpy =
(1  h)
2

1 +
 (1  b)
2

   (1  b) s
2
(27)
where the superscript npsignies no policy.
The most crucial di¤erence between the environment with and without policy is in
the nature of the equilibrium. As we have discussed earlier, the case with policy focuses
on an equilibrium in which pension benets successfully induce the old and separated to
withdraw from the labor force. The appropriate comparison is with a setting without policy
intervention in which every jobless worker is in the labor force.
DEFINITION A steady-state equilibrium without policy intervention and with la-
bor market participation from all workers consists of wage functions wuo ; w
e
o; and wy
[dened in (8), (9), and (27)], and a quadruple (; ; U; Fv) satisfying the following con-
ditions: (i) Symmetric Nash bargaining; (ii) (Unrestricted Entry for rms): v = 0;
(iii) (Steady-State): U = Fv = M(U;Fv), with np = 1; and (iv) the labor market
participation constraints hold: Juo > 0; Jy > J
u
o ; and J
e
o > 0:
As before, rms enter until v = 0: Analogous to the equilibrium entry condition
derived in the model with policy, it can be checked that
np =
4(1  h)  8a+ 2(1  b) (1 + s)
(1  b) [(1  h) + 2 (1  h)  4a] (28)
We conclude this section with an important result.
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Proposition 4 Young workers always earn higher wages in the absence of induced retire-
ment. That is, wnpy > wy where wy is dened in eq. (12).
This is the crux of the income redistribution argument. Pension policies, by their very
nature, raise the future value of employment, and thereby reduce wages to the young. In
the absence of such policies, as Proposition 4 indicates, the wages of the young are relatively
high. Since they form the bulk of the job seekers, ceteris paribus, a higher wage to the
young adversely a¤ects rm entry, and possibly reduces aggregate worker welfare.
Furthermore, by encouraging old displaced workers to retire, social security programs
can play an important role in improving the allocation of workers to jobs since they allow
young workers to more easily nd jobs and accumulate rm-specic human capital. In
what follows below, we rst aim to demonstrate our e¢ ciency rationale for public pensions
and induced retirement. In order to accomplish this objective, we explicitly introduce a
government budget constraint into our framework so that pensions are funded within the
economy. Specically, we present a setting where payroll taxes imposed on both rms
and workers are used to pay for pension benets. Section 6 below establishes that public
pensions through induced retirement can lead to higher welfare than when public pensions
are absent.
6 Are pension programs welfare enhancing?
The principal point of this paper is to argue that pension programs, through their e¤ect
on the wage structure, their inducement to pull the old displaced workers out of the la-
bor market, and thereby encourage rms to create more job vacancies, can improve the
operation of the labor market and might therefore be desirable on e¢ ciency grounds alone
(abstracting from the more standard equity and political economy motives). To that end,
before discussing the overall e¤ects of pension programs and their interactions with labor
market conditions, we rst seek to demonstrate that endogenously funded pension pro-
grams and publicly induced retirement can lead to higher welfare than having no pension
program at all. Below we sketch a version of our model that introduces payroll taxes on
workers and rms which are then used to pay the old separated to stay away from the labor
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market. We compute aggregate welfare (dened below) for this economy and compare it
to aggregate welfare for the economy described in Section 5.
Much of the analysis set forth above will remain valid in this section. To begin with,
the value functions for workers of di¤erent types are given by
Jy =  s+  [(1  )wy + (1  b)Jeo + bJso ] + (1  )Juo
Juo =  s+ (1  )wuo ; Jeo = [(1  )weo + (1  )Bo] ;
and, under the conjectured equilibrium that displaced workers do not search,
Jso = (1  )Bo
where  is the common tax rate on wage and benet income. In addition, in the steady-state
we observe:
v =  a+ ~uy f[1  h  (1 + )wy] + (1  b)f + bvg+ ~uo f[1  h  (1 + )wuo ] + vg+ (1  )v
f = 1  (1 + )weo + v
It is easily veried that
v =
 a+ ~uy [1  h  (1 + )wy] + ~uy(1  b) [1  (1 + )weo] + ~uo [1  h  (1 + )wuo ]
1  ~uy(1  b)2   ~uy(1  b)b2   ~uo   (1  )

Using the process of wage determination analogous to the one described in Section 3 above,
it can be shown that
wuo =
(1  h)
2
; weo =
1 + (1  ) (1  )Bo
2
(29)
2wy = [(1  h) + (1  b) f1  (1 + )weog] (30)
  [b(1  )Bo + (1  b) f(1  )weo + (1  )Bog   (1  )wuo ]
Utilizing the wage functions described above, along with v = 0, we have the same equi-
librium entry condition as in (24) given by
a


1
~uy

= [1  h  (1 + )wy]+(1 b) [1  (1 + )weo]+

~uo
~uy

[1  h  (1 + )wuo ] (31)
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What remains for us to describe is the government budget constraint. The payroll taxes
paid by rms are given by
Fv~uow
u
o + Fv~uywy + Ffw
e
o
since some job vacancies will be lled by the long-term unemployed and others by the
young. In addition, some taxes will be paid by rms with retained workers from prior
established employment relationships. In contrast, taxes paid out by all the workers are
given by
wy
2
+
(1  b) (weo + Bo)
2
+ uow
u
o +
b
2
Bo
The expenditure by the government on workers is given by
(1  b)
2
Bo +
b
2
Bo
We assume that the government balances its budget. It is also easy to verify that the
Ff =
(1  b)
2
; Fv =
(1  b) (2  )
 [2(1  b) + (1  )] ; F =
(1 b)
2

h
1  b2    1 2
i + (1  b)
2
For completeness sake, we dene an equilibrium below.
DEFINITION A steady-state equilibrium with no labor market participation by
displaced workers and internally funded pensions consists of wage functions wuo ; w
e
o; and wy
[dened in (29), and (30)], and a quadruple (; ; U; Fv) satisfying the following conditions:
(i) Symmetric Nash bargaining; (ii) (Unrestricted Entry for rms): v = 0; (iii) (Steady-
State): U = Fv = M(U;Fv); (iv) the labor market participation constraints hold:
Juo > 0; Jy > J
u
o ; and J
e
o > (1  )Bo and the discouraged worker constraint holds,25 and
v) the governments budget is balanced.
25 In this case, the discouraged worker constraint requires
(1  )Bo >  s+  [(1  )ws +  (1  )Bo] + (1  )(1  )Bo (32)
where
ws =
1  h+ (1  ) (1  )Bo
2
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We choose a population-based average of expected lifetime utility of each group of
workers as our welfare criterion. In particular, we adopt the following measure of social
welfare as our welfare criterion:26
W W (B0; ) = 1
2
Jy +
1
2
(1  b)Jeo +
1
2
bJso +
1
2
(1  )Juo
The task ahead is to compare aggregate welfare in the presence and absence of policy.
In the presence of (internally-funded) policy, the old and separated stay out of the labor
market. In the absence of such policy intervention, every worker participates in the labor
market but there are no pension payments or taxes. The question for us is: is aggregate
welfare higher when no pension programs are present and all workers remain active in the
labor force?
As is readily apparent, a number of non-linearities enter the model with the introduction
of the government budget constraint especially when benets are funded by distortionary
taxes. Therefore, we use numerical computations for the general case of non-linear matching
to illustrate our reasoning.
Example 2 Let s = 0:15; a = 0:2;  = 0:4; h = 0:25,  = 0:5; B0 = 0;  = 0:9; and
b = 0:2: Under this parametric specication, pension programs are not present, and it can
be checked that all workers stay active in the labor market. The aggregate welfare in this
case is 0:2095. Now consider an otherwise identical parametric specication except that
B0 is allowed to go from 0:25 to 0:4 and  = 0:8: By the government budget constraint, it
follows that  varies from 0:108781 to 0:17043. For this specication, it can be veried that
all the conditions dened in the denition of equilibrium in this section are satised. As
illustrated in Figure 2, aggregate welfare under induced retirement is higher than when there
are no public pension benets and retirement does not occur. Importantly, the probability
of employment () is higher and wages to the young are lower under policy than in the
absence of pension programs.
Note that policy-induced retirement occurs as long as pension benets are su¢ ciently
generous and the implicit tax on elderly work is su¢ ciently high ( = 0:8 < 1). Once
26See Davidson et. al. (1994) for a similar welfare criterion.
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pension benets are equal to 0:25, induced retirement occurs. In particular, we observe
that publicly induced retirement generates higher welfare since the vertical intercept in
Figure 2 is equal to 0.247. As mentioned in the above example, welfare in the absence of
pension programs is 0.2095.
7 Conclusion
Most countries have large public pension programs. Traditionally, these programs have
been used to induce retirement by the elderly in order to free up jobs for the young and
to redistribute income across generations. This paper provides an e¢ ciency rationale for
the inter-generational income redistribution focus of such programs in a framework which
explicitly accounts for the role of the lifecycle in the labor market. It develops a model
of the labor market characterized by search and matching frictions and embeds it into
an overlapping generations framework. In our model, public pension programs alter the
age composition of the labor force by inducing the jobless elderly to retire in exchange
for pension benets. By requiring a long history of labor market attachment in order to
receive benets, these programs raise the future value of current employment for the young.
In turn, this raises the future value of current employment which alters the bargaining
positions of agents and e¤ectively redistributes income from the young to the old. In
addition, depending on the design of the pension program, we show that the redistribution
can take place directly via the government (explicit transfer payments) or indirectly via
rms in the form of higher wages.
We believe that careful general equilibrium analysis of the underlying issues can shed
important light and o¤er some guidance to policymakers. In this regard, we have ventured
to study the e¢ ciency and desirability of publicly-funded pension programs within the
context of a dynamic general equilibrium model. In order to consider how age-targeted
labor market policies such as social security should be designed in light of the ongoing trend
towards an increasingly older population, we adopted the OG setup because it allows a
natural and explicit separation of the workforce into young and old workers. The framework
captures an important inter-generational conict between the young and old since, in the
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model, these groups concurrently compete for the same jobs; additionally, the bargaining
positions of the two during wage negotiations are di¤erent due to their di¤erent stages
along the lifecycle. Moreover, the OG structure is naturally conducive to studying pension
programs that tie in with the lifecycle and other low frequency aspects of the labor
market, such as, long job tenure, and the accumulation of rm-specic human capital.
We used the search framework in the labor market for three important reasons. First, it
allows us to endogenize both the supply side (through labor market participation choices)
and the demand side (via endogenous creation of vacancies) of the labor market, a clear
departure from the lump-of-labor line of thought in which there is a xed stock of job
vacancies. Importantly, we see that the amount of job creation responds to the design of
pension programs through their impact on age earnings proles in the economy.
Second, the retirement literature suggests that social security programs are designed
to reduce labor market congestion problems for the young. The diminished prospects for
job search are also a prominent factor in the labor market participation decisions of older
workers. In this regard, we argue that a model with undirected search is appropriate
since it allows us to demonstrate how labor market congestion contributes to potential
intergenerational conicts in the labor market. If rms were perfectly able to discriminate
on the basis of age, this would imply that there are not any intergenerational congestion
di¢ culties between workers and therefore, there would be little role for policy-induced
retirement.
Finally, the decentralized notion of wage bargaining used in our framework allows us
to study the e¤ects of public pension programs on wage determination at each stage of the
lifecycle. This is especially important given the fact that most real-world pension benets
are generally related in some way to the number of years worked and tend to increase with
lifetime earnings. In this context, an important new e¤ect that we identify is the role of
social security in redistributing agents outside options over the lifecycle. In our setup,
younger (longer tenure) workers have the option of waiting while older (equally productive
but with shorter tenure) workers do not. This inequity translates into high wages for
the young, escalating labor costs (since young workers constitute the largest pool of the
unemployed from which rms will have to nd workers), and reduces rm entry. Positive
29
replacement rates, raise the lifetime value of working when young and thereby reduces this
ine¢ ciency. It is true that the e¤ect we isolate is especially strong in our two-period model
but the basic qualitative insight denitely extends to a model in which di¤erent sets of
workers have di¤erent expected tenures with rms.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
In a steady state, contribution to the unemployed pool come from two sources, young
workers (measure 0.5) and never-before-employed workers, of measure (1 )2 . Then, it
follows that
U =
(1  )
2
+
1
2
=
1 + (1  )
2
~uy  uy
U
=
1
1 + (1  )
~uo  uo
U
=
(1  )
1 + (1  )
B Proof of Lemma 2
a) Using (10), we can compute the gains from trade for the rm from hiring a young worker
as:
1  h  wy + bv + (1  b)f + dv   v
which using (5) and rearrangement yields
= (1  h  wy) + (1  b) (1  weo)
Using (11), and (1)-(3), the young workers surplus from nding employment is given by:
wy + bJ
s
o + (1  b)Jeo   Juo
= wy + bBo + (1  b)weo + (1  b)Bo + s  wuo
and further to
= wy + bBo + (1  b)weo + (1  b)Bo + s 
 (1  h)
2
Then, equating the gains from trade, we get
2wy = (1  h) + (1  b) (1  2weo)  bBo   (1  b)Bo   s+
 (1  h)
2
which simplies to
= (1  h)  B0 [(1  b) (1  ) + b+ (1  b)]  s+  (1  h)
2
Notice that [(1  b) (1  ) + b+ (1  b)] = 1: Then, we have
2wy = (1  h)

1 +

2

   (B0 + s) :
b) obvious.
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C Proof of Lemma 4
a) It is easily seen that, as long as the discouraged worker constraint holds, the young will
choose to search as long as there are positive gains from entry within the period:
wy() > s
which reduces to
(1  h)2 + 2[(1  h)  (B0 + s)]  4s > 0:
Solving the above condition for a value of  in which it holds with equality provides us
with a minimal value for . Note that if (1  h) > (B0 + s), then we must use the positive
root as the solution for : Dene L as the value of  which satises the condition (note,
this is the same su¢ cient condition that was required for young wages to be positive). It
is given by:
L   [(1  h)   (B0 + s)] +
2
p
[(1  h)   (B0 + s)]2 + 4(1  h)s
 (1  h)
which is always positive as long as there are some search costs to be incurred by workers.
b) We seek to nd conditions where L > 2s(1 h) : First, recall b1  [(1 h) (B0 + s)]:Thus,
L   b1 +
2
p
b21 + 4(1  h)s
(1  h) >
2s
(1  h)
reduces to
 b1 + 2
q
b21 + 4(1  h)s > 2s
and further to
2
q
b21 + 4(1  h)s > b1 + 2s
Next, squaring both sides yields:
b21 + 4(1  h)s > (b1 + 2s)2
which upon simplifying obtains:
0 >  2B0   s
which always holds.
D Proof of Proposition 1
a) Using (24), and setting  = 1; we get
a
~uy

= (1  h  wy) + (1  b) (1  weo) +

~uo
~uy

(1  h  wuo )
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We begin by substituting in the steady-state population conditions from Lemma 1. Then,
we use (8), (9), and (12) to get
a [1 + (1  )] = (1  h  wy)+ (1 b)

1  1 + (1  )Bo
2

+(1  )

1  h  (1  h)
2

:
Simplication yields
2a+ 2a(1  ) = (1  h) + B0 + s   (1  h)
2
+(1  b)  (1  b) (1  )Bo + (1  ) (1  h)
which further simplies to
(1 ) [2a  (1  h)]+  (1  h)
2
= (1  h)+s+(1  b)+B0 [1  (1  b) (1  )] 2a
and nally to
 =
2 (1  h) + 2s+ 2(1  b) + 2B0 [1  (1  b) (1  )]  4a  [4a  2 (1  h)]
[(1  h) (2 + )  4a]
Notice that
2 (1  h)  4a  [4a  2 (1  h)] = 4 [(1  h)  2a] :
Then, it follows that
 = 2

s+ (1  b) + B0 [1  (1  b) (1  )] + 2 [(1  h)  2a]
[(1  h) (2 + )  4a]

E Proof of Proposition 2
Recall that rms enter until v = 0; or until the revenue from entry equals the upfront
cost a: Also recall that rms take ~uy and ~uo as given, and that wuo does not depend on B0:
Then the revenue from entry R can be written as
R = ~uy (1  h  wy) + ~uy(1  b) (1  weo) + ~uo (1  h  wuo )
Using (8), (9), and (12), we get
R = ~uy

(1  h)  (1  h)
2

1 +

2

+
 (B0 + s)
2

+~uy(1  b)

1  1 + (1  )Bo
2

+ ~uo (1  h  wuo )
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which simplies ultimately to
R = ~uy

(1  h)
2
  (1  h)
2

2
+
(B0 + s)
2

+
~uy(1  b)
2
[1  (1  )Bo] + ~uo (1  h  wuo )
It follows that
@R
@Bo
=
~uy
2
  ~uy(1  b) (1  )
2
=
~uy
2
[1  (1  b) (1  )] > 0
so, an increase in B0 raises the benet from entry but does not raise the cost. Hence, ceteris
paribus, there will be more rm entry with higher B0: The fact that more rm entry leads
to a higher probability of employment follows immediately from di¤erentiating (25) to get
@
@B0
> 0
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